https://www.smh.com.au/culture/books/the-true-corporate-horror-story-that-s-scarier-than-stephen-king-20230123-p5cepi.html

But look back at McKinsey's history and you soon find out what being on the receiving end of its “end-to-end impact” really means. Just ask Disneyland roller coaster rider Brandon Zucker, aged four, who fell out of the Roger Rabbit ride at Disneyland in September 2000 and was crushed by the following car. Actually, you can't ask him, because he died aged 13 after suffering catastrophic brain injuries.

Until Disney hired McKinsey in 1996 to evaluate the park's operation (as in, cut costs, raise profits) the place had a flawless safety record. In business, it makes perfect sense to cut costs and raise profits for shareholders. But wholesale slash-and-burn for a bonanza short-term gain is usually bad policy that can come back to bite you. Just ask the Amazon rainforest.

In this case, the advice came in 1997, along with a hefty bill, in the form of a lengthy report, Transforming Maintenance: Defining the Disney Standard. Implementing the new Disney standard of maintenance resulted in what even McKinsey would have to call “a sub-optimal outcome” for Brandon Zucker. You see, the company changed the ride maintenance policy after noticing that the lap bars on roller coasters were inspected daily “when records show they never fail”.

Ride maintenance worker Bob Klostreich, then aged 20, was flabbergasted. “The reason they don't fail is because we check them every night,” he observed at the time. In 1999 Klostreich was fired after raising further safety issues with management. Two months later, Brandon had his “end-to-end impact” McKinsey safety experience. There were to be more injuries and deaths on other rides, until the Californian government finally stepped in and forced Disney to clean up its act in 2003.