Ce n'est pas vraiment du 1 vs 1 mais du 1 vs 0.5. (Oui les pays arabes c'est le 0.5)

The argument advanced in this chapter, in a nutshell, is that the Arab coalition facing Israel in 1947-49 was far from monolithic; that within this coalition there was no agreement on war aims; that the inability of the Arabs to coordinate their diplomatic and military moves was partly responsible for their defeat; that throughout the conflict Israel had the military edge over its Arab adversaries; and, finally, and most importantly, that Israel's leaders were aware of the divisions inside the Arab coalition and that they exploited these divisions to the full in waging the war and in extending the borders of their state.

As far as the military balance is concerned, it was always assumed that the Arabs enjoyed overwhelming numerical superiority. The war was accordingly depicted as one between the few against the many, as a desperate, tenacious, and heroic struggle for survival against horrifyingly heavy odds. The desperate plight and the heroism of the Jewish fighters are not in question. Nor is the fact that they had inferior military hardware at their disposal, at least until the first truce, when illicit arms supplies from Czechoslovakia decisively tipped the scales in their favour. But in mid-May 1948 the total number of Arab troops, both regular and irregular, operating in the Palestine theatre was under 25,000, whereas the Israel Defence Force (IDF) fielded over 35,000 troops. By mid-July the IDF mobilized 65,000 men under arms, and be December its numbers had reached a peak of 96,441. The Arab states also reinforced their armies, but they could not match this rate of increase. Thus, at each stage of the war, the IDF outnumbered all the Arab forces arrayed against it, and, after the first round of fighting, it outgunned them too. The final outcome of the war was therefore not a miracle but a faithful reflection of the underlying military balance in the Palestine theatre. In this war, as in most wars, the stronger side prevailed. -Avi Shlaim

in Eugene Rogan and Avi Shlaim, eds., The War for Palestine: Rewriting the The United States and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict History of 1948. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 79-103.

Comprendre par là que la victoire israélienne lors des guerres précédentes est prévisible et que quand les musulmans se réuniront pour de vrais alors là ça signera la fin de la partie.